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1 Introduction
While employer-sponsored automatic enrollment retirement plans such as 401(k) and 403(b)
programs have become the main vehicle for retirement savings, only about half of the U.S.
private-sector workforce currently has access to such plans. This situation has prompted
more than half of all U.S. states to consider mandating that private-sector firms without
employer-sponsored plans enroll their employees in a state-sponsored auto-enrollment plan.1
Although the purpose of expanding access to auto-enrollment plans is to increase retirement
savings, the mere availability of a retirement savings plan is not guaranteed to be effective
in encouraging retirement savings for two main reasons. First, when low-income workers
gain access to save, they might not be able to afford to save due to liquidity constraints.
Second, low- and mid-income workers might not wish to save, as personal savings could
crowd out their eligibility for means-tested social transfers in retirement. It is thus crucial
that state-sponsored auto-enrollment plans be carefully designed to consider the liquidity
constraints as well as the crowd-out effect between personal savings and social support from
means-tested social transfers.
This paper focuses on the optimal design of the default contribution rate in state-
sponsored auto-enrollment plans, as it is one of the key policy considerations shaping work-
ers’ saving decisions. We use sufficient statistics to capture how liquidity constraints and the
crowd-out effect of retirement savings perceived by workers impact their decisions to accept
the default contribution rate. Based on the sufficient statistics capturing workers’ responses
to the default contribution rate, we develop a tractable framework for analyzing the welfare
impacts of the default contribution rate. In the welfare framework, we take into account the
actual crowd-out between retirement savings and means-tested social benefits if accepting
1State governments impose a mandate on employers so that employers are required to provide employees
access to either employer-sponsored or state-sponsored auto-enrollment plans. Employees who are automat-
ically enrolled in a plan are not required to participate. A typical auto-enrollment plan allows employees to
opt out anytime.
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the default contribution rate effectively increases workers’ savings. We ultimately derive the
first explicit formula of the optimal default contribution rate from the welfare framework,
empirically estimate key determinants in the formula, and provide direct policy guidance for
setting the default contribution rate in state-sponsored auto-enrollment plans.
Using individual-level administrative data from the first state-sponsored plan in the
United States launched in 2017, OregonSaves, we identify how workers respond to the default
contribution rate when given access. While extensive previous research has examined the
effect of default contributions, the causal effect of the default contribution rate on saving
behavior remains largely unclear due to data limitations. Previous studies, dating back to
Madrian and Shea (2001), have relied on data from employer-sponsored retirement plans
where employers often match employee contributions to encourage employees to save. The
presence of employer matching confounds the impact of the default rate on saving behavior,
as employees’ saving decisions are now under the influence of both the default rate and em-
ployer matching. Given that OregonSaves does not allow employer matching, it provides a
unique opportunity to tease out the causal effect of the default contribution rate on retire-
ment savings. We express the causal effect in terms of sufficient statistics and directly map
them to the core welfare analysis in this paper, which derives the optimal level of the default
contribution rate.
Taking into account workers’ responses to the default contribution rate, we characterize
the social welfare tradeoff that the policymaker faces when setting the default contribution
rate. On the one hand, the policymaker aims to help low- and mid- income workers accu-
mulate personal savings as long as they can afford to save. This objective has the additional
benefit of potentially reducing public expenditures on means-tested social transfers,2 as low-
and mid- income workers with personal retirement savings may rely less on social support.
2Some of the major means-tested social transfers for senior citizens are Medicaid, Supplemental Security
Income, and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). All of them have income and asset limits.
See Moffitt (2018) for details.
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To achieve the goal of substituting personal retirement income sources for public sources,
the policymaker should set the default contribution rate relatively low to keep workers from
opting out of the default, even when workers might not fully appreciate the long-term value
of savings in the present. On the other hand, if setting the default contribution rate to
an undesirably high level effectively prompt people to overcome procrastination, the policy-
maker should raise the default rate to encourage more people to make an active choice that
fits their own long-term saving goals. We express these two counterbalancing forces in an
explicit formula of the optimal default contribution rate. Additionally, we characterize these
forces in terms of statistics that can be empirically estimated, and ultimately compute the
optimal level of the default contribution rate.
We first empirically estimate the effectiveness of the default contribution rate in encour-
aging savings among passive savers (i.e., those who accept the default rate). We conduct an
online survey to elicit the time preferences of OregonSaves-eligible workers, in which we find
that on average workers weakly prefer spending most of their income now over spreading out
the income between now and later. In other words, the effectiveness of the default among
passive savers on increasing savings would be relatively moderate. Moreover, we evaluate
the social value of each additional dollar of savings by income, as an extra dollar of savings
of low-income workers are more likely to reduce public expenditures on means-tested social
transfers than that of high-income workers. We also quantify the welfare effect of the default
contribution rate on active savers (i.e., those who elect a non-default rate) by referring to the
previous literature (Choukhmane, 2018). Active savers contribute to social welfare in that
they save public resources to incentivize them to take action. They overcome procrastination
and pay attention to their saving decisions solely because the default rate is far from their
preferred rates. Combining these two forces, a baseline calculation suggests that the optimal
default contribution rate is 8%.
The analysis of the optimal design of default saving policies extends our understanding of
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the power of public policy for improving the efficiency of redistribution. Unlike conventional
income transfer policies (e.g., taxation, cash transfers, and in-kind transfers) that redistribute
a large amount of public resources across people, default saving policies usually involve
indirect policy suggestions that influence individual behavior without transferring public
resources. Under the influence of default saving policies, the majority of the population will
take on their personal responsibilities to support their own retirement. As a result, public
resources in means-tested social programs could be redistributed to people who need them
the most.
Contributions to the Literature. Our welfare analysis of the default contribution
rate is related to three strands of literature. First, the optimal design of default retirement
saving policies – the default contribution rate in particular – has been a focus in previous
research. Based on some early discussions about the welfare impact of the default rate
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2003; Carroll et al., 2009), Bernheim et al. (2015) provided the first
explicit guidance that the optimal default contribution rate should be set at the employer
matching cap in an employer-sponsored retirement plan. Goldin and Reck (2018) extended
that analysis by comparing the welfare consequences between saving at the default and
making a suboptimal active decision. Our paper establishes a broader social context for the
analysis of the optimal default rate by taking into account the interaction between private
savings and eligibility for means-tested welfare programs. Additionally, we develop the first
sufficient statistics formula for the optimal default rate that directly connects the causal
effect of the default rate with the welfare analysis. Our formula complements Bernheim
et al. (2015), as we evaluate the optimal default contribution rate in a retirement plan
without employer matching.
This paper also contributes to the literature on a sufficient statistics approach for optimal
public policy. We extend the applicability of the sufficient statistics approach to “nudge”
policies, and in particular the default retirement saving rate. Farhi and Gabaix (2019)
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discussed optimal nudges in taxation, while we focus on optimal nudges in the context of
default saving policies. We specifically provide a tractable microfoundation for one type of
sufficient statistics, social marginal welfare weights, in the context of default saving policies.
One type of social marginal welfare weights characterizes the policymaker’s redistributive
preference, which is taken as given (Saez, 2002; Saez and Stantcheva, 2016). The other type
introduced by Hendren (2017), called efficient welfare weights, characterizes the distortionary
cost generated by individuals which can be estimated from data.3 That distortionary cost
(e.g., individuals decrease their income to maximize tax credits) generates fiscal externalities.
In this paper, we explore another type of fiscal externalities that can also be captured by the
welfare weights, which is the substitution between private savings and means-tested social
transfers. When individuals increase their savings under the influence of default saving policy,
they generate a positive fiscal externality by reducing public expenditures on means-tested
welfare programs.
Our work also sheds light on two long-standing questions in household finance. The first
question is why a substantial fraction of American households saves so little. Hubbard et al.
(1995) and Scholz et al. (2006) argue that the explanation largely lies in asset-based and
means-tested welfare programs and Social Security benefits. Here we provide an alternative
explanation: one reason people do not save is because they are not automatically enrolled in a
savings plan. The second question we address is the optimal level of savings. There is little
consensus on the optimal level of retirement savings, given the substantial heterogeneity
in health, expected life expectancy, retirement lifestyle, and family structure across the
population. Instead of thinking about individuals’ optimal level of savings, we provide a
new perspective stemming from social welfare. Retirees lacking sufficient personal savings
have to rely on social safety net programs which increase the fiscal burden imposed on all
3Finkelstein (2019) provides an extensive discussion on the interpretation and applications of Hendren
(2017).
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taxpayers to finance these social programs. From a policy perspective, social welfare is
maximized when the majority of people who can afford to save do so, leaving means-tested
welfare programs to support only those people who cannot afford to save.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional back-
ground of the OregonSaves program and provides descriptive statistics for the first two years
of the program as of June 2019. Section 3 discusses the welfare impact of the default rate in
a sufficient statistic framework and presents an explicit formula of the optimal default rate.
Section 4 describes the identification strategies and estimation results of the key statistics in
the optimal default formula using OregonSaves administrative and survey data. In Section
5, we calculate the optimal default rate using the estimation results from Section 4. Section
6 concludes.
2 An Overview of OregonSaves
In this section, we provide the institutional background and some preliminary empirical
evidence on the first state-based mandatory retirement savings program in the United States,
called OregonSaves.
2.1 Institutional Background
The 2015 passage of Oregon House Bill 2960 set into motion the creation of the OregonSaves
program, the first U.S. state-sponsored retirement savings program. The Oregon Retirement
Savings Board was given statutory authority to research and design the plan, with a target
launch date of July 2017. OregonSaves requires that all private-sector employers including
non-profit organizations either offer their own retirement plans or enroll their employees in
OregonSaves. Besides Oregon, nine states have passed the legislation to establish a state-
sponsored retirement plan. Table 1 provides information on the state-sponsored plans across
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the states.
OregonSaves is structured as a Roth Individual Retirement Account (IRA), with auto-
matic enrollment, a default (after-tax) contribution rate of 5%, and employee-only contribu-
tions. Once an employer registers and provides OregonSaves with employees data, employees
enter a 30-day enrollment period during which time their identity is verified and employees
may choose to opt out. A Roth account4 is created at the end of the enrollment period for
each employee that has not opted out and whose identity is successfully verified. Enrollment
in OregonSaves sets contributions levels at a 5% default rate, though employees can choose
to save at different rates (up to 100% of pay), or opt out at any time. By default, the
first $1,000 contributed into each participant’s OregonSaves account is invested in a money
market account. When a saver’s account balance reaches $1,000, subsequent contributions
default into an age-appropriate target date fund.
OregonSaves differs from conventional employer-sponsored retirement plans such as 401(k)
or 403(b) plans in two key ways. First, OregonSaves participants may access their contribu-
tions invested in the money market account without penalty. The OregonSaves account is a
combination of an emergency savings account (first $1, 000 withdrawal without penalty), and
a retirement savings account (long-term investment returns from target date funds). Sec-
ond, OregonSaves allows workers to contribute to the same account via different employers
if they hold multiple jobs. Additionally, their accounts also follow them as they move from
one job to another. In other words, workers can accumulate retirement savings in the same
account over time. This feature of account-specific contributions can potentially encourage
employees to accumulate more personal savings, especially for those working in smaller firms
with high job turnover rates.
OregonSaves was rolled out to private-sector workers lacking access to workplace retire-
4Contributions to a Roth account are not tax free, while qualified withdrawals and earnings in the account
are tax-free.
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ment plans in seven waves. A first wave of firms volunteered to be in the pilot program,
followed by six compulsory waves. Employer waves are determined by the number of em-
ployees at the firm, with larger employers having to register earlier than smaller firms. For
example, the largest firms (100+ employees) began a compulsory registration period on Oc-
tober 1, 2017, and the smallest firms (4 or fewer employees) will start enrolling May 12,
2020. In practice, however, some smaller firms did register earlier than required, and some
unknown number of larger firms may not have registered to date. As of June 29, 2019,
OregonSaves was still rolling out to smaller employers. From January 1, 2020, an employer
penalty will be levied on companies that do not provide access to their own retirement plans
or to OregonSaves for employees.
Once an employer is registered, the firm submits employees’ Social Security numbers,
dates of birth, and names to OregonSaves, after which a 30-day enrollment period begins.
During the enrollment period, employees may opt out of the program. If they do not do so
during the first 15 days, OregonSaves then conducts an identity verification check. Employees
who are successfully identified are then deemed eligible for enrollment at the end of the 30-
day window.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Using individual-level administrative data from the first two years of the OregonSaves pro-
gram, we present empirical evidence on (a) the impact of OregonSaves on expanding access
to workplace retirement savings programs, (b) the characteristics of employers required to
provide access to OregonSaves for their employees, (c) the characteristics of workers cov-
ered by OregonSaves, (d) the impact of OregonSaves on retirement savings, and (e) early
evidence on the effect of automatic escalation in contribution rates on participation and
contributions.5
5Additional descriptive results are documented in Chalmers et al. (2019).
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2.2.1 OregonSaves Expansion and Characteristics of Registered Employers
As of June 29, 2019, 4,970 employers had registered their businesses in OregonSaves. This
means that they previously did not offer employer-sponsored retirement plans, and all current
and future employees would have access to OregonSaves with an option to opt out. About
171,243 individuals had their personal information provided to OregonSaves by an employer,
and median firm size was 16. Employees’ average age in 2019 was 37. As of June 29, 2019,
OregonSaves had accumulated $22.7 million in total assets.
Food services and retail trade are two of the largest industries represented in Oregon-
Saves in terms of the number of registered employers. Food services and health care are
two of the largest industries in terms of the number of employees ever had access to Ore-
gonSaves. It is our understanding that the large number of workers in health care can best
described as home-health care workers. Finance, insurance, and managements are some of
the smallest industries in OregonSaves, in terms of both the number of registered employers
and employees.
2.2.2 Characteristics of Workers Having Access to OregonSaves and Their Par-
ticipation and Contribution Decisions
Panel A of Table 2 itemizes the status of the 171,243 employees who had a chance to en-
roll in OregonSaves. During the enrollment window, 41,757 (24.4%) employees opted out,
while another 21,600 (12.6%) employees opted out after the enrollment window. There were
29,332 (17.1%) employees awaiting the background check, which, in many cases, extends
their pending status. There were 12,630 (7.4%) employees who enrolled and passed their
background checks, yet their employers had not submitted payroll. Finally, 65,924 (38.5%)
names were enrolled, where the background check was successfully completed, the employer
was submitting deferrals for at least one employee, and the employee had not opted out.
In a sense, these are the employees who may now participate in OregonSaves. Neverthe-
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less, the 29,332 pending cases and the 12,630 employees still to contribute are also potential
participants for whom we cannot yet observe their choices. Of the original 171,243 names
submitted, approximately 37% elected to opt out; this does not, however, imply that the
complement of this group represents participants.
In principle, the program participation rate refers to the employees who are making or
have made contributions to OregonSaves, as a percent of employees eligible to participate,
working, and who have an employer cooperating with OregonSaves. Yet when measuring
the participation rate, there are two challenges to defining the denominator. Given the data
to which we have access, we cannot distinguish between someone who is working and not
contributing, from someone who is not working. It is also difficult to identify employees not
participating because of actions taken by their employers, rather than actions they themselves
took. As result, we must define a group of potential participants which is eligible and active
using a set of imperfect but necessary assumptions.
Panel B of Table 2 describes the group we term Eligible Active Workers (EAW): these
are employees eligible for an OregonSaves account and who appear to be actively working
for at least one employer making payroll contributions for at least one employee. To be more
precise, the EAW group includes those who opted out of OregonSaves while still actively
working, plus people with a positive account balance in the past but currently a zero balance,
plus people having a positive account balance currently, plus people with a positive balance
and positive current contribution. This group comprises 76,438 people. In this group,
23,503 individuals received a monthly contribution to their accounts in June 2019, with a
mean contribution amount of $110. For employees with a positive contribution amount and
a positive contribution rate, we estimate their monthly incomes (=contribution/contribution
rate) to be $2,182. By way of comparison, the March 2018 Current Population Survey reports
average monthly income of $4,843 (and median income of $3,411) for individuals who worked
in the previous year. This comparison supports the conclusion that OregonSaves serves a
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population with low- and mid- income levels.
Panel A of Table 3 presents data for the 40,652 OregonSaves participants having a positive
OregonSaves account balance. Given total assets of $22.7 million, the average balance per
account stood at $558 as of June 2019. Panel B of Table 3 shows that 28,083 of the 40,652
with a positive balance are classified as eligible active workers. When averaged over accounts
with a positive balance, the average account balance for EAW is $653.20.
To illustrate some of the challenges in defining participation rates, we refer to Table 3
where 40,652 individuals have a positive account balance. Some of these, however, are not
defined as active. One might argue that the participation rate could include all people who
have participated as a fraction of current EAW or 53% (40,652/76,438), which is the ratio of
anyone with a positive balance relative to the EAW group. If we focus on EAW workers who
are eligible for contributions and actively working, the participation rate includes EAWs who
ever had a positive balance relative to all EAWs, or 41.3% (31,573/76,438). In June 2019,
there were 23,503 people contributing to the program. If one were interested in the number of
contributing employees in June 2019 as a fraction of EAW, this would produce a contribution
participation rate of 30.7% (23,503/76,438). Benchmarking the numbers of participants is
difficult relative to prior studies, because our data include multiple employers, multiple jobs
for some employees, and months in which no contributions are paid, along with our limited
ability to discern workers’ employment status from our data especially when people opted
out or set their contribution rates to zero.
Table 4 presents the distribution of contribution rates for eligible active workers (EAW).
About 22.1% of the EAW elected the default rate of 5% in June 2019. About 4,000 or 5.3%
of EAW had contribution rates of 6%, a large fraction of which may be attributed to the
auto-escalation feature of the plan. Details and evidence about auto-escalation are shown
in Table 6 which will be discussed in the following section. Of the 76,438 EAW, 69% had
contribution rates of zero, a tally that includes people who opted out (closed their accounts),
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along with EAWs who later set their rates to zero without closing their accounts, to leave
open the possibility of saving later. Of the remaining employees, few had contribution rates
other than 0, 5%, and 6%.
Table 5 offers a summary of the reasons people offered for opting out of the OregonSaves
program. Panel A tallies answers provided by users where they had to select one of a set of
choices: the most common reason given was that people felt they could not afford to save
as 29% of those who opted out offered that explanation. Another 20.6% of those opting
out said that they already had their own retirement plans, and 25% gave “other” reasons.
Additionally, 8% suggested they were not interested in contributing through their current
employers. Panel B offers additional insights into the more than 5,000 responses given when
an employee elected the “other” category indicated in Panel A. The three most prominent
rationales for opting out include that fact that people were no longer employed, were not
interested, and were already near or in retirement.6
2.2.3 Automatic Escalation
Table 6 reports the impact of automatic escalation on participating and contribution de-
cisions. On January 1, 2019, workers who had open accounts for six months were eligible
for auto-escalation. Additionally, workers who initially elected any non-zero contribution
rates (default or non-default) were eligible for auto-escalation. Similar to the initial default
contribution rate, eligibles could actively opt out of the auto-escalation arrangement; if they
did not, contribution rates automatically increased on January 1 by 1 percent, and would
continue to do so until they reached 10%. Panel A shows subgroups of all individuals eligible
for auto-escalation. Panel B shows how eligible active workers (EAW) who were eligible for
auto-escalation responded. Panel B is more informative because EAWs are active workers
6Other themes included opposition to the government and to auto-enrollment plans, as well as anti-social
comments such as “none of your dam business.” Example comments are provided as-is with the exception
that curse words have been slightly disguised.
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with positive earnings who make non-zero contributions. Individuals counted in Panel A
include inactive workers not making positive contributions even with a non-zero contribu-
tion rate recorded. Results for EAW are similar to the full sample in Panel A except for two
numbers. First, only 10.7% of EAW opted out of the program after auto-escalation took into
effect. This suggests that most individuals opted out of the program after auto-escalation,
because they no longer worked for the employer offering OregonSaves. Second, 66.4% of
EAW eligible for auto-escalation adhered to the new rates at the end of June, 2019, higher
than 51.1% for all individuals.
In summary, our early findings for the first two years of OregonSaves suggest several
preliminary conclusions. First, 4,970 employers complied with the mandate to register their
businesses in OregonSaves as of June 29, 2019, most of which were small businesses with fewer
than 20 employees. The largest industries represented in OregonSaves were food services and
health care (mostly home health care workers). Second, through these registered employers,
OregonSaves provided 171,243 private sector workers access to workplace retirement sav-
ing plans. Moreover, among these covered workers, 76,438 were eligible to contribute and
were actively working so that they could make positive contributions to their OregonSaves
accounts if they elected a positive contribution rate. Of these, 41.3% participated in the
program and 30.7% made a positive contribution in June 2019. The leading rationales for
opting out were being unable to afford to save or having an existing retirement plan. About
72% of participating EAWs accepted the 5% default rate. The average monthly positive
contributions were $110. Finally, when the contribution rates automatically increased by 1
percent on January 1, 2019, about 70% of EAWs eligible for automatic escalation accepted
the rate increase.
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3 A Sufficient Statistic Framework for the Optimal De-
fault Contribution Rate
Optimally designing the default contribution rate is one of the key policy considerations for
state and municipal governments interested in launching a government-sponsored retirement
savings program similar to OregonSaves. In this section, we develop a sufficient statistics
framework to derive the optimal default rate depending on statistics that can be directly
estimated from the OregonSaves data described in the previous section.
3.1 Setup
In a two-period intertemporal choice model, each worker divides her labor income Z between
consumption in the work life and savings for retirement. Each worker has a preferred con-
sumption amount C = (1−s)Z, and a preferred saving amount S = sZ, where s corresponds
to her preferred saving rate. (Throughout this paper, we will use uppercase letters to denote
levels and lowercase letters to denote rates.) Formally, s maximizes the intertemporal deci-
sion utility: U(C, S) = u(C) + βδv(S)−K.7 We define that the normative time preference
δ captures the normative reasons to discount future utility (e.g. non-labor wealth, family
structure, health, or bequest motive). The behavioral time preference β captures the be-
havioral reasons to underestimate future utility (e.g. time inconsistency or misinformation).
The variable K represents the perceived disutility of taking action to set up a retirement
account and elect the preferred rates s; we assume the disutility cost K is homogeneous
across the population. To simplify notation, we define workers having the same preferred
rate s as the same type, where s captures heterogeneity in time preferences and labor income:
7The preferred rate s = arg maxs˜ u(C˜(s˜)) + βδv(S˜(s˜)) − K, where C˜ = (1 − s˜)Z, and S˜ = s˜Z. The
preferred consumption amount C and the preferred saving amount S are the maximands of the decision
utility: {C, S} = arg max{C˜,S˜} u(C˜) + βδv(S˜) − K. Additionally, we make two simplifications about the
return on savings. The investment return of savings is risk-free, and the investment return is offset by
inflation so that the real value of savings is S in terms of the dollar value in the first period.
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s := (δ, β, Z). The density of each type is denoted by ms.
We then assume a policymaker launches an automatic enrollment retirement savings
program with a default contribution rate r ∈ (0, 1]. The default saving amount for a given
type of workers with earnings Zs is Rs = rZs. Each type of workers chooses their pension
savings Ps between two discrete options: the preferred saving amount Ss or the default saving
amount Rs. The indirect decision utility function for a type-s worker in the presence of a
default rate r is expressed as:
U(Cs, Ps; s, r,K) = u(Cs) + βsδsv(Ps)−K1{Ps 6= Rs}, (1)
where Cs + Ps = Zs and Ps ∈ {Ss, Rs}. The functions u(·) and v(·) are both increasing and
concave. The disutility K in the presence of a non-zero default rate represents the perceived
costs of actively opting out of the default choice. We will refer to K as the opt-out costs,8
which include but are not limited to time and psychological costs of switching from the
default rate to worker’s preferred rate. We assume that the preferred saving rate s, which
determines each worker’s type, is independent of the default rate r.
The policymaker thinks workers should maximize normative utility N , which can differ
from decision utility U . The indirect normative utility function N is formally expressed as:
N(Cs, Ps; s, r,K, pi) = u(Cs) + δsv(Ps)− piK1{Ps 6= Rs}
= U + (1− βs)δsv(Ps) + (1− pi)K1{Ps 6= Rs}, (2)
subject to the same budget constraint Cs + Ps = Zs. Following Goldin and Reck (2018),
we define piK as the fraction of the normative opt-out costs: that is the realized cost after
workers take action to opt out of the default that reduces their welfare by piK. The remaining
8The opt-out costs K specifically mean the costs of opting out of the default option, not opting out of
the savings program. Opting out of the program is considered as electing a zero contribution rate.
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fraction (1− pi)K is the psychological opt-out costs that opted-out workers perceive ex ante
but do not affect their welfare ex post. Similar to K, pi is assumed to be homogeneous across
the population.
Equation (2) presents two sources of discrepancy between U and N . First, from the
policymaker’s perspective, workers might undervalue the utility of savings. The size of the
underestimation, (1 − βs)δsv(Ps), is defined as the welfare internality of savings. That is
the welfare gain of savings that workers do not consider when making saving decisions. One
of the potential causes of this underestimation is due to the difference in time preferences
between workers and the policymaker. Specifically, the policymaker is more forward-looking
and discounts the value of future utility less than workers. This hypothesis is related to a
large body of literature examining the disagreement in time preferences between the long-run
self and the short-run self, where a policymaker can act like the long-run self (Laibson, 1997;
O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Moser and Olea de Souza e Silva (2017) and Choukhmane
(2018) have analyzed the welfare consequences of time inconsistency in the context of re-
tirement saving policies. A more recent paper by Ericson and Laibson (2018) use the term
“present-focused” preferences to characterize individuals overestimating immediate utility
compared to future utility documented in models such as hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, procrastination, and naivete`. Another potential reason of the underestimation
of the utility of savings could be misinformation: that is, the policymaker may have more
accurate information than do workers regarding public sources of retirement income such as
Social Security and means-tested social transfers. Based on ambiguous or incorrect infor-
mation, workers could be too optimistic about retirement support from social insurance and
undervalue the importance of accumulating personal savings.
A second source of discrepancy between decision utility U and normative utility N could
be that workers overlook the benefit from making an active decision.The size of the benefit
from taking action, (1 − pi)K, is defined as the welfare internality of action. That is the
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welfare gain of taking action because workers perceive the cost before opting out of the
default but the cost does not exist after opting out. One potential cause is that workers
overestimate opt-out costs. Such a miscalculation could explain why people stay at the
default even though it may not be their preferred choice (Bernheim et al., 2015; Goldin
and Reck, 2018; Luco, 2019). Additionally, underestimation of the benefit from making an
active decision could also be caused by inattention (Caplin and Dean, 2015; Karlan et al.,
2016; Gabaix, 2018). In the context of retirement savings, workers may never pay attention
to planning for retirement or notice any policy changes that could impact their retirement
security, so that they remain at the default.
Given worker’s type-specific choices of consumption Cs and savings Ps ∈ {Ss, Rs}, the
policymaker will select a default rate r to maximize aggregate normative utility weighted by
type-specific Pareto weights αs:
W (r) = max
r
∫
Σ(s)
αsN(Cs, Ps; s, r,K, pi)dms (3)
subject to individual optimization
{Cs, Ps} = arg max
{C˜,P˜}
U(C˜, P˜ ; s, r,K) (4)
where
C˜ + P˜ = Zs.
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3.2 Optimal Default Contribution Rate
Let r∗ denote the optimal default contribution rate. Next we consider the welfare impact of
a marginal increase in the optimal default rate from r∗ to r∗ + dr. Based on the individual
optimization problem characterized in Equation (4), workers of the same type select the
same contribution amount Ps ∈ {Ss, Rs}. For a continuum of types s ∈ [0, 1], workers whose
preferred saving rates are between sl and sh will adhere to the default option where sl <
d < sh. The density of workers saving at the default mr = ml +mh =
∫ d
s=sl
dms +
∫ sh
s=d
dms.
We define workers who remain at the default as passive savers, where ml is the fraction of
passive savers (in the population) whose preferred rates are below the default, and mh is
the fraction of passive savers whose preferred rates are above the default. We refer to ml as
l-type passive savers, and mh as h-type passive savers. Figure 1 displays how each type of
passive savers responds to a marginal perturbation of the optimal default rate.
To derive a formula for the optimal default rate that is empirically implementable from
the theoretical welfare framework, we introduce the following sufficient statistics:
• l: the semi-elasticity of the percentage change in the density of l-type passive savers
with preferred rates below the default (dml) with respect to all passive savers (mr =
ml +mh), as the default rate increases by 1 percentage point (dr), equal to
dml
mr
1
dr
;
• h: the semi-elasticity of the percentage change in the density of h-type passive savers
with preferred rates above the default (dmh) with respect to all passive savers (mr =
ml +mh), as the default rate increases by 1 percentage point (dr), equal to
dmh
mr
1
dr
;
• gs: type-specific social marginal welfare weights. It is the social marginal value of
savings for a given type-s worker relative to the marginal value of public funds (λ)
evaluated at the optimal default rate in units of dollars. As a marginal increase in per-
sonal savings could crowd out a given type’s eligibility for means-tested social transfers
financed by public funds, $gs measures that, given the current social transfer system,
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the policymaker is indifferent between providing $gs to a type-s worker via means-
tested social transfers and encouraging her to save an additional dollar. As a result,
the type-specific marginal value of savings is inferred by the value of the unspent public
funds on means-tested social benefits. The welfare weights can be formally expressed
as:
gs :=
αsv
′
Ps
λ
. (5)
The welfare analysis is also based on a few key assumptions sufficient to derive the optimal
default rate:
1. Individuals only make their saving decisions once at the beginning of their working
lives.9
2. The total opt-out costs K and the fraction of the normative opt-out costs pi are homo-
geneous across types.
3. Individual preferred rates s are independent of the default rate r.
4. The utility function of savings Ps is linear: v(Ps) = Ps.
Next we characterize the optimal default rate r∗ based on the policymaker’s problem
described in Equations (3) - (4). A marginal increase in r∗ induces three welfare effects on
passive savers whose preferred rates are between sl and sh. First, default saving amount of
passive savers marginally increase on the intensive margin by
dN(Rs)
dr
. Second, a fraction
of h-type passive savers whose preferred rates are above r∗ start saving at the increased
new default r∗ + dr, because it is now closer to their preference. This welfare effect on the
extensive margin is proportional to
dmh
dr
, and the savings amount per worker decreases from
9Most retirement saving plans allow people to adjust their contribution rates anytime, although in reality
few people do so. Usually plan participants do not make active adjustments after they make their initial
saving decisions (accepting the default, switching to a non-default rate, or opting out of the program) unless
they face some exogenous shocks (i.e., income or unemployment shocks).
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Sh(= shZh) to Rh(= rZh). Third, a fraction of l-type passive savers whose preferred rates
are below r∗ stop saving at the increased new default r∗ + dr because it is farther from
their preference. This welfare effect on the extensive margin is proportional to
dml
dr
, and the
savings amount per worker decreases from Rl(= rZl) to Sl(= slZl). The first-order condition
for the social welfare function W equals zero at the optimum:10
dW (r∗)
dr
=
d
dr
∫ sh
s=sl
αsN(Ps)dms
≈
∫ sh
s=sl
αs
dN(Rs)
dr
dms +
dmh
dr
αh(N(Rh)−N(Sh))− dml
dr
αl(N(Sl)−N(Rl)) (6)
= 0.
Proposition 1. Based on Assumptions 1-4, the default contribution rate satisfies the fol-
lowing equation at the optimum:
r∗ =
dI + dSl − dSh + dKl − dKh
dRl − dRh .
Proof. See Appendix A. The overall welfare effect can be decomposed into several terms
after the optimal initial default rate marginally increases from r∗ to r∗ + dr:
1. The aggregate weighted social welfare gain to all passive savers on the intensive margin
is dI
dr
= ml
md
·gl ·(1−βl)δlZl+ mhmd ·gh ·(1−βh)δhZh. For example, as the initial default rate
increases by dr, l-type passive savers on the intensive margin increases their savings
by dr ·Zl. Although they might feel indifferent to the marginal policy change, there is
an increase in the welfare internality of savings, which is the realized welfare gain to
passive savers that they do not internalize. Based on Equation 1, the marginal increase
10We use N(Ps) to represent N(Cs, Ps; s, r,K, pi) in Equation (3) subject to the budget constraint Cs+Ps =
Zs. Pension savings Ps is chosen between the default saving amount Rs(= rZ) and the preferred saving
amount Ss(= sZ). The following differentiation under the integral sign employs the Leibniz integral rule
where the end points of the interval of the integral sl and sh are functions of the derivative argument r.
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in the welfare internality of savings for a l-type worker is (1−βl)δldrZ, and the marginal
increase is weighted by gl to evaluate its impact on social welfare. The social value of the
marginal increase in the welfare internality of savings is then weighted by the fraction
of l-type passive savers ml
md
· gl · (1− βl)δldrZl. Analogously, the social welfare gain to
h-type passive savers is mh
md
· gh · (1− βh)δhdrZh. The aggregate weighted social welfare
gain on the intensive margin equals dI = ml
md
·gl ·(1−βl)δldrZl+ mhmd ·gh ·(1−βh)δhdrZh.
2. The welfare gain to l-type workers for switching to their preferred rate sl under the
new default r∗+ dr is dSl
dr
= |l|gl(1− βl)δlslZl. As the new default rate is farther from
their preferred rate, the fraction of the l-type workers on the margin of opting out of
the default is dml
mr
= dr|l|. Each l-type worker opting out of the default enjoys the
welfare internality of saving at their preferred rate (1 − βl)δlslZl weighted by gl. The
total social welfare gain is dSl = dr|l| · gl · (1− βl)δlslZl.
3. The social welfare loss to h-type workers for no longer saving at their preferred rate
sh is
dSh
dr
= |h|gh(1 − βh)δhshZh. As the new default moves closer to h-type workers’
preference, the fraction of h-type workers on the margin of starting to save at the
default (dr|h|) no longer enjoy the welfare internality of saving at their preference,
(1− βh)δhshZh, weighted by gh. Similar to the size of dSl with an opposite direction,
the welfare loss to h-type workers for no longer saving at their preference equals dSh =
dr|h| · gh · (1− βh)δhshZh.
4. The social welfare loss to l-type workers for no is dRl
dr
· r∗ = |l|gl(1 − βl)δlr∗Zl. As
l-type workers on the margin (dr|l|) stop saving at the default, the social welfare loss
equals the welfare internality of saving at the default (1 − βl)δlr∗Zl weighted by its
social marginal weight gl. The total social welfare loss to l-type workers on the margin
for no longer saving at the default equals dRl = dr|l| · gl · (1− βl)δlZl.
5. The social welfare gain to h-type workers for starting to save at the default rate is
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dRh
dr
· r∗ = |h|gh(1− βh)δhr∗Zh. As h-type workers on the margin (dr|h|) start saving
at the default, the social welfare gain equals the welfare internality of saving at the
default (1− βh)δhr∗Zh weighted by gh. The total social welfare gain to l-type workers
on the margin for starting to save at the default equals dRh = dr|h| · gh · (1−βh)δhZh.
6. The social welfare gain to l-type workers for making an active choice is dKl
dr
= |l|gl(1−
pi)K. For each l-type worker on the margin of electing their preferred rate, they
enjoy the positive welfare internality of action measured by (1 − pi)K. The welfare
internality of action has social consequences, because the marginal personal welfare
gain can improve social welfare by gl. The social welfare gain to all l-type workers on
the margin (dr|l|) for taking action equals dKl = dr|l| · gl · (1− pi)K.
7. The social welfare loss to h-type workers for no longer making an active choice is
dKh
dr
= |h|gh(1− pi)K. For each h-type worker on the margin of accepting the default,
they become inactive and lose the welfare internality of action, (1− pi)K weighted by
gh. The social welfare loss to all h-type workers on the margin of no longer taking
action equals dKh = dr|h| · gh · (1− pi)K.
4 Estimating Key Parameters for the Optimal Default
Contribution Rate
In this section, we outline an empirical strategy to identify key statistics to be used to
estimate the optimal default contribution rate in Proposition 1 using OregonSaves data
described in Section 2. Table 11 lists all the statistics that need to be estimated and their
values. Key statistics discussed in this section are:
• l: the semi-elasticity of the percentage change in the fraction of l-type passive savers
(with preferred rates below the default, denoted dml) with respect to the default rate
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• h: the semi-elasticity of the percentage change in the fraction of h-type passive savers
(with preferred rates above the default, denoted dmh) with respect to the default rate;
• δl, δh: the normative time preference for l- and h-type passive savers; and
• βl, βh: the behavioral time preference for l- and h-type passive savers;
4.1 Semi-elasticities l and h
The semi-elasticity l measures the percentage change in the fraction of l-type passive savers
with preferred rates below the default (dml) with respect to all passive savers (mr = ml+mh),
as the default rate increases by one percentage point (dr), equal to
dml
mr
1
dr
. Similarly, h
is the semi-elasticity of the percentage change in the density of h-type passive savers with
preferred rates above the default (dmh) with respect to all passive savers (mr = ml+mh), as
the default rate increases by one percentage point (dr), equal to
dmh
mr
1
dr
Suppose the default
rate increased from r to r′, then l and h can be formally expressed as:
l(r) =
dml
mr
1
dr
=
ml′ −ml
mr
1
r′ − r , (7)
and
h(r) =
dmh
mr
1
dr
=
mh′ −mh
mr
1
r′ − r , (8)
where m′l is the fraction of l-type passive savers under the new default rate r
′, ml is the
fraction of l-type passive savers under the original default rate r, mr = ml +mh is the total
fraction of passive savers, m′h is the fraction of h-type passive savers under the new default
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rate r′, and mh is the fraction of h-type passive savers under the original default rate r.
when the default rate is d′ and md is the fraction of passive savers when the default rate is
d.
Based on Equations (7) and (8), we have two strategies to estimate l and h with their
own advantages. A key assumption these two strategies rely on is that the semi-elasticities
are constant across default rates: l(r) = l and h(r) = h. This empirical assumption can
be relaxed when we observe long-term data from OregonSaves.
4.1.1 Identification from Automatic Escalation in OregonSaves
We exploit the exogenous variation in the default rate resulting from automatic escalation
to identify the semi-elasticity for l-type passive savers l. We use workers’ responses to auto-
escalation to proxy how they would respond differently to two initial default rates. Section 2
and Table 6 describe the institutional details and summary statistics of automatic escalation.
We start by identifying ml′ −ml in Equation (7), which is the change in the fraction of
l-type passive savers as the default rate automatically increased from 5% to 6%. Although
we do not directly observe the fraction of l-type passive savers under any given default rate,
who are passive savers with an underlying preferred rate below the default rate, we can
infer the change in the fraction of l-type passive savers from how many of them become
active savers after auto-escalation. The increase in the fraction of l-type active savers is the
same size as the decrease in the fraction of l-type passive savers, based on the theoretical
assumption 3 in Section 3.2 that the underlying preferred rate is invariant.
Table 7 presents the distribution of contribution rates for eligible active workers (EAW)
eligible for auto-escalation at the end of November 2018 and at the end of June 2019. We
exclude EAW eligible for auto-escalation who opted out of the auto-escalation arrangement
before it took effect January 1, 2019. Panel B of Table 6 shows that, among 5,694 eligible
EAW, 1,186 (= 410 + 776) opted out of auto-escalation before it took effect. This leaves
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the sample for estimating the elasticity  of 4,508 (= 5,694 - 1,186). The reason we exclude
these is that we need a precise estimate of individual responses after the exogenous rate
increase. The 1,186 eligible EAW who opt out of auto-escalation in advance were done
so for various other reasons. November 2018 is the last month before individuals received
notifications about auto-escalation that would take into effect on January 1, 2019. June 2019
is six months after auto-escalation occurred, so that eligible workers could have had enough
time to adjust their contribution rates in response to the rate increase.
Table 7 shows that 6.6% are l-type active savers saving between 1% - 4% under the 5%
original default rate before auto-escalation, and 17.2% are l-type active savers between 1%
- 5% under the 6% new default rate after auto-escalation. As a result, l-type active savers
increase by 10.6% after auto-escalation. This suggests that l-type passive savers decreases
by 10.6% after auto-escalation: ml′−ml = −10.6%. We also observe that there are 91.9% of
passive savers under the 5% default rate: mr = 91.9% in Equation (7). It is worth noting that
in the November distribution, no eligible EAW opted out of the program because workers
had to participate in OregonSaves to be eligible for auto-escalation. Additionally, their
accounts had to be open for at least 6 months to be eligible (before June 30, 2018). As
the OregonSaves program is still rolling out and most workers were registered after June
30, 2018, only a small fraction of EAW were eligible for auto-escalation. We will be able to
observe more workers eligible for auto-escalation in the future. We plug in the numbers into
Equation (7) and get:
l =
ml′ −ml
md
· 1
r′ − r
=
−10.6%
91.9%
· 1
6− 5
= −0.12. (9)
The estimate of l suggests that 12% of l-type passive savers (whose preferred rates are
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below the default) stopped saving at the default rate as it increased by 1 percentage point.
Although we can use auto-escalation to identify l, we cannot identify h, which quantifies the
fraction of h-type active savers becoming passive savers as the initial default rate increases
by 1 percentage point (h-type are savers with a preferred rate higher than the default). Since
h-type active savers opted out of the original 5% default rate before auto-escalation, they
were unaffected by the increase in the default rate. We do not know how they would respond
to a default rate other than 5%.
4.1.2 Identification Using Data from Related Literature
We use data from Beshears et al. (2012) to estimate h. They studied differential responses
to the default rate by income in three employer-sponsored retirement saving plans and they
found that the low-paid were more likely to save at the default than the high-paid. Using
their data, we investigate two groups of employees in the same firm who were assigned
two different default rates. Firm C in their paper had a 3% default contribution rate for
2,785 full-time employees hired at the firm between January 1, 2003 and February 29, 2004.
The same firm C had a 5% default contribution rate for 3,765 full-time employees hired
between June 1, 2005 and July 31, 2006. Employers provided matching contributions in
both time periods. The maximum employer match was 7%, meaning that employers matched
employees’ contributions up to 7% of their earnings if employees contributed 7% or more.
The key underlying assumption required to exploit the variation in default rates to esti-
mate h is that the characteristics of two cohorts facing different default rates must be similar.
This assumption largely holds based on the summary statistics provided by Beshears et al.
(2012): the mean age for both groups was 33-34 years and the mean annual income was
$42,000 - $44,000. Employees in Firm C on average earned more than eligible workers in
OregonSaves whose average annual income is $26,212.8 (in 2019 dollars) as shown in Table
2. Appendix B provides the distributions of employee contribution rates at Firm C when
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the default rate was 3% and 5%. Based on Equation (8), we need to compute the change in
the fraction of h-type passive savers (mh′ −mh) with respect to the fraction of all passive
savers (mr). Similar to the calculation of l in Section 4.1.1, the increase in the fraction of
h-type passive savers is the same size as the decrease in the fraction of h-type active savers.
Data from Beshears et al. (2012) show a decrease by 11% of h-type active savers when the
default rate increases from 3% to 5%. That is equivalent to a 11% increase in h-type passive
savers: mh′ − mh = 11%. We also observe 32% total passive savers under the 3% default
rate: mr = 32%. Plugging these numbers into Equation (8), we get:
h =
mh′ −mh
mr
· 1
r′ − r
=
11%
32%
· 1
5− 3
= 0.17. (10)
The value of h suggests that 17% of active savers would start saving at the default rate if
the initial default rate increased by 1 percentage point. We can also use data from Beshears
et al. (2012) to obtain an estimate for l:
′l =
ml′ −ml
md
· 1
r′ − r
=
−8%
32%
· 1
5− 3
= −0.13. (11)
We find ′l(= −0.13) close to l(= −0.12) estimated from the OregonSaves data in Section
4.1.1. One caveat of using any data from employer-sponsored retirement plans is that the
estimates could be confounded by the employer matching cap. Specifically in firm C studied
by Beshears et al. (2012), this firm offers matching up to 7%. As the default rate moves
27
closer to 7% (from 3% to 5%), employees are more likely to actively switch to 7% to take
full advantage of the matching benefit than they would do without matching. Consequently,
when the default rate is 5%, we should expect more active savers with matching than without
matching. Equivalently, we should expect fewer passive savers with matching than without
matching, which makes the observed mh′ biased upwards and ultimately makes h biased
downwards in Equation (10).
4.2 Normative and Behavioral Time Preferences δ and β
The time preference parameters in the optimal default rate formula in Proposition 1 captures
how a normative and a present self would discount future utility differently due to reasons in-
cluding present bias, inattention, and misinformation. This section illustrates one method to
experimentally elicit present-biased discount rates following Andreoni and Sprenger (2012).
4.2.1 Estimation Strategy Using Survey Data
Besides the individual-level administrative records of OregonSaves savings data, we surveyed
a subgroup of OregonSaves eligible workers in June 2019, including those who opted out and
who were participating. We sent the survey to 441 workers and 143 responded (32.4%
response rate). Survey respondents had two weeks to answer the survey through an email
link and all respondents received a $40 Starbucks gift card for completing the survey.
Our identification strategy, called the Convex Time Budget (CTB) approach, follows
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) to simultaneously estimate the time preferences β − δ and
the curvature of the utility function. Survey participants answered questions about how to
allocate 100 experimental “tokens” to either a “sooner” time t, or a “later” time t + k, at
different “token exchange rates” r. They choose C tokens to receive at a sooner time and R
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tokens to receive at a later time continuously along a convex budget set:
(1 + r)C +R = 100. (12)
We used variations in starting times t to identify respondents’ behavioral discount rates
β. We used variations in delay length k and interest rates (1 + r) to identify the nor-
mative discount rates δ and utility function curvature. Participants faced 16 intertempo-
ral decisions involving 16 combinations of (t, k, 1 + r), where t = (0, 1), k = (1, 2), and
1 + r = (1, 1.01, 1.02, 1.05). Table 8 shows the time periods, token budgets, token unit
values, and annual interest rates for all 16 combinations. Appendix C provides the survey
questions where four questions with the same set of (t, k) combination are displayed on the
same page. Participants could change their answers to questions within the same set, but
they could not change answers after they moved on to the next page with a different (t, k)
combination.
For each question, participants had a budget of 100 tokens. Tokens allocated at a sooner
time was worth at while tokens allocated to a later time were worth at+k. For example, in
the first question, each token was worth $100 today and $100 in a year. Participants were
asked to move a slider to divide the 100 tokens between two time points as they preferred.
In this question, t = 0, k = 1, and 1 + r = at+k
at
= 1. If one allocated 60 tokens today and
40 tokens to a year away, the survey would show the total dollar amount she would have
today, $6,000 (= $100 × 60), and the total dollar amount she would have in a year, $4,000
(= $100 × 40). The total dollar amount allocated to a sooner time was denoted C and the
total dollar amount allocated to a later time was denoted R in Equation (12).
Given consumption at a sooner time C and consumption at a later time R, we express
decision utility U as a multi-period time separable CRRA (constant relative risk aversion)
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utility function subject to budget constraint (12):
U(C,R) =
1
α
(C −W )α + βδk 1
α
(R−W )α.
The parameter α is the CRRA curvature parameter, β is the behavioral time preference, δ is
the normative time preference, and k is the delay length between the two time points. The
variable W is background consumption which is the negative of the minimum consumption
level in a typical year. Following Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), we assume that the back-
ground consumption level at two time points is the same. When we log-linearize the decision
utility function U(C,R), we obtain:
ln
(C −W
R−W
)
=
( ln β
α− 1
)
1{t = 0}+
( ln δ
α− 1
)
k +
( 1
α− 1
)
ln (1 + r). (13)
W is the negative of minimum annual consumption level asked in the survey. C and R
are survey responses to the intertemporal allocation questions described in Appendix C;
1{t = 0} is an indicator if the sooner time period is today; k is the delay length between the
sooner time and the later time described in Table 8; and ln (1 + r) is the natural log of the
annual interest rate in Table 8. We use a two-limit Tobit maximum likelihood regression to
estimate parameters β, δ, and α.
We also estimate these parameters using an alternative utility function, constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA). The decision utility U in this formulation subject to budget constraint
(12) is expressed as:
U(C,R) = − exp(−ρC)− βδk exp(−ρR),
where ρ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The log-linearized utility function is:
C −R =
( ln β
−ρ
)
1{t = 0}+
( ln δ
−ρ
)
k +
( 1
−ρ
)
ln (1 + r). (14)
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4.2.2 Results
Table 9 shows estimates of β and δ from two-limit Tobit maximum likelihood regressions.
There were 143 survey respondents who answered the time preference survey questions, and
they made 1,765 intertemporal choices in total. Column 1 shows estimates of the CRRA
regression (Equation (13)). The annual background consumption w = −1, 040, equal to
the negative of the minimum consumption level among all survey respondents. The average
normative discount factor δ is 0.995 (standard deviation 0.006), and the average behavioral
discount factor is β is 0.987 (s.d. 0.005). Column 2 shows estimates of the CARA regression
(Equation (14)). The average δ is 0.987 (s.d.0.005) and the average β is 0.993 (s.d.0.007).
For a baseline calculation of the optimal default rate, we assume that the normative time
preference is the same for l- and h-type passive savers: δl = δh = 0.995. The behavioral time
preference for h-type passive savers is assumed to be the average level under CRRA utility:
βh = 0.987. The behavioral time preference for l-type passive savers is assumed to be one
standard deviation below the average: βl = 0.982.
5 Computing the Optimal Default Contribution Rate
The optimal default rate is computed by plugging the values listed in Table 11 into Proposi-
tion 1. An additional empirical assumption required to calculate dI, the welfare impact on
the intensive margin, is that we use an unweighted average welfare component to approxi-
mate a weighted average welfare component, as the weighting of different types of passive
savers is unobserved. The optimal default rate r∗ using baseline estimates can be computed
as follows:
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r∗ =
dI + dSl − dSh + dKl − dKh
dRl − dRh
=
2.21 + 2.8− 6.5 + 39.6− 38.3
69.5− 71.8
= 8.3%.
The optimal default is higher than the current 5% default rate in OregonSaves mainly
for two reasons. First, the fraction of passive savers accepting the optimal default rate could
be overestimated. We use individual responses to auto-escalation to proxy how two identical
groups of workers would respond to two initial default rates differently. Since the initial
default rate is more salient than auto-escalation, passive savers are more likely to opt out of
a high initial default rate compared to a low initial default than opting out of auto-escalation.
Second, our estimates suggest that passive savers greatly benefit from saving at the default.
The actual benefit of default savings could be lower than calculated because the current
welfare framework does not take into account Social Security benefits. additional retirement
income from Social Security could diminish the marginal benefit of default savings. The
combination of these two reasons implies that the actual social welfare gain from saving at
the default could be lower than estimated. The 8% baseline calculation should therefore be
considered as an upper bound of the optimal default rate.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a sufficient statistics framework that directly connects empirical
analysis of the causal impact of the default contribution rate on individual saving behavior
with welfare analysis of the optimal design of the default contribution rate. We introduced
a novel set of sufficient statistics to capture low- and mid-income workers’ adherence to the
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default contribution rate based on their perceived liquidity constraints, their concerns on
private savings crowding out the eligibility for means-tested social transfers, and their over-
estimation of the opt-out cost. Given workers’ choices on accepting the default contribution
rate, we considered the actual interaction between private savings and means-tested welfare
programs in a tractable framework for analyzing the welfare impacts of the default contribu-
tion rate. We ultimately derived the first explicit formula for the optimal default contribution
rate. Using individual-level administrative and survey data from the first state-sponsored
auto-enrollment plan in the U.S. called OregonSaves, we empirically estimated key statistics
in the formula of the optimal default rate. We found that, when the default rate increased
by one percentage point, about an additional of 12% of workers who had passively stayed
at the previous default rate would switch to a non-default rate or opt out of the program.
Given this insight, a baseline calculation suggested that the optimal default rate should be
set at 8%.
Our analysis not only provides direct policy guidance on state-sponsored auto-enrollment
plans that expand access for low-income workers, it also lays the groundwork for designing re-
tirement saving policies that take into account the actual social transfer and social insurance
systems.
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Table 1: State Legislation Establishing a State-Sponsored Retirement Plan, October 2019
State Type of program Status Default rate Program/Bill website
Oregon Mandatory auto Roth IRA Launched in July 2017 5%, auto escalation
up to 10%
OregonSaves
Illinois Mandatory auto Roth IRA Launched in May 2018 5%, no auto escala-
tion
Illinois Secure Choice
California Mandatory auto Roth IRA Launched in July 2019 5%, auto escalation
up to 8%
CalSavers
Maryland Mandatory auto Roth IRA Scheduled to launch in mid-2020 To be determined Maryland$aves
Connecticut Mandatory auto Roth IRA Bill passed in 2016 To be determined Connecticut program
New Jersey Mandatory auto Roth IRA Bill passed in March 2019 3% New Jersey Secure Choice Sav-
ings Program Act
Vermont Voluntary to employers; auto
Roth IRA to workers
Bill passed in June 2017 To be determined Green Mountain Secure Retire-
ment Plan
New York Voluntary to employers; auto
Roth IRA to workers
Bill passed in February 2018;
scheduled to launch in April
2020
To be determined New York State Secure Choice
Savings Program Act
Washington Expanding from a voluntary
program to a mandatory pro-
gram to all private-sector busi-
nesses
Voluntary program launched in
2015; bill for the mandatory pro-
gram passed the State Senate in
March 2019; waiting for a House
floor vote
To be determined Washington Secure Choice Sav-
ings Program Act
Massachusetts Expanding from a voluntary
program only to non-profits to
a mandatory program to all
private-sector businesses
Voluntary program launched in
October 2017; bill for the
mandatory program introduced
in January 2019
To be determined Massachusetts Secure Choice
Savings Program Act
Note: In a mandatory auto Roth IRA program, private-sector employers are required to provide employees access to
either a state-sponsored plan or an employer-sponsored plan such as 401(k). Employees are automatically enrolled in a
retirement plan with a default contribution rate. They can always opt out or elect a non-default contribution rate. Roth
IRA is an individual retirement account where contributions are not tax-free but qualified withdrawals and earnings in
the account are tax-free. Besides these 10 states that have passed the legislation for a voluntary or a mandatory program,
about another 21 states have introduced legislation but not yet enacted. AARP summarized the status of these 21 states:
https://www.aarp.org/ppi/state-retirement-plans/savings-plans/.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Individuals Ever Had Access to OregonSaves, June 2019
N % $
Panel A: All individuals
Total unique individuals entered by employers 171,243 100.0 –
Immediate opted-out individuals 41,747 24.4 –
Delayed opted-out individuals 21,600 12.6 –
Pending individuals 29,332 17.1 –
Enrolled individuals w/o payroll info 12,630 7.4 –
Enrolled individuals with payroll info 65,924 38.5 –
Panel B: Eligible active workers (EAW)
Total EAW 76,438 100.00 –
Immediate opted-out workers 27,743 36.3 –
Delayed opted-out workers 17,122 22.4 –
EAWs with no balance 6,793 8.9 –
Suspended contributors 1,277 1.7 –
Contributors 23,503 30.7 –
Average monthly contributions if > 0, June 2019 – – 110
Average monthly income – – 2,184
Note: Data from anonymized administrative records as of June 29, 2019. In Panel A, imme-
diate opted-out individuals left the OregonSaves program during the first 30-day enrollment
window. Delayed opted-out individuals left the OregonSaves program after the 30-day win-
dow. Pending individuals were in the background check, failed the background check, or
in the 30-day window (all employers). Enrolled individuals with payroll information passed
the background check and the initial 30-day window (at least 1 employer), but program is
waiting for payroll information. Enrolled individuals with payroll information passed the
background check, passed the initial 30-day window (at least 1 employer), and the same
employer(s) provided payroll information. In Panel B, eligible active workers (EAW) are
persons eligible for contributions (at least one employer) and inferred to be actively working
on June 29, 2019. Individuals eligible for contributions have passed the background check
and the 30-day enrollment window (at the same employer(s)), which provided payroll in-
formation for at least one employee at the firm. Suspended contributors are EAWs with a
positive balance but no monthly contributions in June 2019. Contributors are EAWs with a
positive balance and positive monthly contributions in June 2019.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Individuals with a Positive Account Balance, June 2019
N $
Panel A: All individuals with a positive balance
All individuals with a positive balance 40,652 –
Opted-out individuals with a positive balance 3,409 –
Participating individuals with a positive balance 37,243 –
Average balance if positive – 558
Total assets – 22.7 million
Panel B: Eligible active workers (EAW) with a positive balance
EAWs with a positive balance 28,083 –
Opted-out EAWs with a positive balance 3,303 –
Participating EAWs with a positive balance 24,780 –
Average balance if positive – 653
Note: Data from anonymized administrative records on June 29, 2019. Panel A reports
statistics for all individuals ever had access to OregonSaves with a positive balance on June
29, 2019. Opted-out individuals with a positive balance are persons who opted out of the
program before June 29, 2019 but had ever contributed and did not withdraw all contribu-
tions. Participating individuals with a positive balance are persons who were participating in
the program on June 29, 2019, had ever contributed, and did not withdraw all contributions.
Panel B presents statistics for eligible active workers (EAW) with a positive balance on June
29, 2019. EAWs are persons eligible for contributions (at least one employer) and inferred
to be actively working on June 29, 2019. Individuals eligible for contributions have passed
the background check and the 30-day enrollment window (at the same employer(s)), which
provided payroll information for at least one employee at the firm.
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Table 4: Distribution of OregonSaves Contribution Rates for Eligible Active Workers (EAW),
June 2019
Contribution rate (%) N. EAW Percent of EAW (%)
0 52,852 69.1
1 512 0.7
2 546 0.7
3 824 1.1
4 181 0.2
5 16,875 22.1
6 4,038 5.3
7 80 0.1
8 90 0.1
9 14 0.0
10 332 0.4
>10 94 0.1
Total 76,438 100
Note: Data from anonymized administrative records on June 29, 2019. The contribution rate
refers to the average contribution rate of all current employers where employees are eligible
and active workers. These include employees who have opted out in the zero contribution
rate bin if they are EAW. About 22.1% of EAW had contribution rates of 5%. About 5.3%
had contribution rates of 6%, a large fraction of which can be attributed to the automatic
escalation feature of the plan. On January 1, 2019, workers who had opened their accounts
for six months were eligible for auto-escalation. The rates automatically increased by 1
percent unless workers actively chose to opt out of the auto-escalation arrangement.
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Table 5: Reasons for Opting Out Provided by Eligible Active Workers (EAW), June 2019
Panel A: Main reasons N %
I can’t afford to save at this time 13,142 29.3
I don’t qualify for a Roth IRA
due to my income
214 0.5
I don’t trust the financial mar-
kets
1,230 2.7
I have my own retirement plan 9,236 20.6
I would prefer a Traditional IRA 488 1.1
I’m not interested in contribut-
ing through this employer
6,468 14.4
I’m not satisfied with the invest-
ment options
773 1.7
Other 11,269 25.1
Did not specify 2,045 4.6
Total 44,865 100.0
Panel B: Sample explanations of “Other” reasons employees opted out
Characterization of responses % of other Verbatim quote
Left employment Large Quit job
Not interested Large Nunca
Retiring soon or already Large 85 years old
Anti government Noticeable Babylon is falling. One Love. One Heart.
What was built on the sand will not stand.
Anti opt out plan Noticeable Because you have no g#$am right to automat-
ically sign me up for this bulls***.
Anti-social Noticeable not your dam buisness
Confused by plan Noticeable Because I dont want the government’s ROTH
IRA. Its going to be terrible compared to what
I could get for the price with another competi-
tor.
Fees are too high Noticaeble 1.01% return on my money. but a 1% yearly
fee....no thanks
Note: Data from anonymized administrative records as of June 29, 2019. Opted-out workers
(N=44,865) include eligible active workers who opted out during the first 30-day enrollment
window through all employers (immediate opted-out workers, N=27,743) and those who
opted out anytime through all employers (delayed opted-out workers, N=17,122).
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Table 6: Summary Statistics for Individuals Eligible for Automatic Escalation, June 2019
Panel A: All individuals eligible for auto escalation N %
Opted out of auto increase before notification on Dec 1, 2018 505 6.8
Opted out of auto increase after notification before taking into
effect on Jan 1, 2019
781 10.6
Rate auto increased, actively opted out of the program end of
June 2019 (6 months after auto increase)
2,217 30.0
Rate auto increased, then actively lowered rate end of June 2019 71 1.0
Rate auto increased, then actively raised rate by more than 1
percent end of June 2019
46 0.6
Rate auto increased by 1 percent end of June 2019 3,781 51.1
Total 7,401 100.0
Panel B: EAW eligible for auto escalation N %
Opted out of auto increase before notification on Dec 1, 2018 410 7.2
Opted out of auto increase after notification before taking into
effect on Jan 1, 2019
776 13.6
Rate auto increased, actively opted out of the program end of
June 2019 (6 months after auto increase)
610 10.7
Rate auto increased, then actively lowered rate end of June 2019 71 1.2
Rate auto increased, then actively raised rate by more than 1
percent end of June 2019
46 0.8
Rate auto increased by 1 percent end of June 2019 3,781 66.4
Total 5,694 100.0
Note: Data from anonymized administrative records as of June 29, 2019. On January
1, 2019, workers who had accounts open for six months were eligible for auto-escalation.
Additionally, workers who initially elected any non-zero contribution rate (default or non-
default) were eligible for auto-escalation. Contribution rates are automatically increased by
1 percent until they reached 10%, every year on January 1 for all eligible workers. Auto-
escalation eligibles may actively opt out of the auto-escalation arrangement any time. Panel
A shows subgroups of individuals eligible for auto-escalation. About 6.8% of them opted
out of the auto-escalation option before the OregonSaves administrator sent a notification a
month before auto escalation took into effect (Dec 1, 2018). About 10.6% opted out after
they received the notification, and before it took into effect. About 30% opted out of the
OregonSaves program at the end of six months after auto-escalation occurred (June 30,
2019). One percent lowered their rates while still contributing at the end of June 30, 2019;
0.6% raised their rates at the end of June 30, 2019; and 51.1% were unresponsive to auto-
escalation. Panel B shows how eligible active workers eligible for auto-escalation responded.
66.4% accepted the auto-escalation arrangement.
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Table 7: Distribution of Contribution Rates for Eligible Active Workers (EAW) Eligible for
Automatic Escalation Before and After Automatic Escalation
Before: Nov 2018 After: June 2019
Contribution rate (%) N % N %
0 – – 409 9.1
1 81 1.8 16 0.4
2 85 1.9 81 1.8
3 110 2.4 97 2.2
4 22 0.5 69 1.5
5 4,142 91.9 97 2.2
6 18 0.4 3,632 80.6
7 17 0.4 26 0.6
8 8 0.2 29 0.6
9 3 0.1 6 0.1
10 19 0.4 34 0.8
>10 3 0.1 12 0.3
Total 4,508 100.0 4,508 100.0
Note: Data from anonymized administrative records as of June 29, 2019. This table identifies
the fraction of active and eligible workers (EAW) eligible for automatic escalation who did
not opt out of the auto-escalation arrangement before it took into effect. There were 4,508 of
EAWs included in this table, equal to the total EAWs eligible for auto-escalation (N=5,694
in Panel B of Table 6) minus EAWs eligibles who opted out of auto-escalation before it
occurred (N = 1,186 = 410 + 776, first two rows in Panel B of Table 6, so that 4,508
= 5,694 - 1,186). November 2018 was the last month unaffected by auto-escalation. The
OregonSaves administrator notified participants eligible for auto-escalation on December
1, 2018. Auto-escalation happened on January 1, 2019. The contribution rate refers to
the average contribution rate of current employers where employees are eligible and active
workers. Columns 2-3 present that, at the end of November 2018, 91.9% saved at the initial
5% default rate. Columns 3-4 show that, at the end of June 2019, 80.6% saved at the new
6% default rate in June 2019.
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Table 8: Choice Sets to Identify Time Preferences from Survey Responses
Start date Delay length Total # Token unit value Token unit value Annual interest
t (unit: year) k (unit: year) of tokens sooner time at later time at+k rate (1 + r)
0 1 100 100 100 1
0 1 100 99 100 1.01
0 1 100 98 100 1.02
0 1 100 95 100 1.05
0 2 100 100 100 1
0 2 100 99 100 1.01
0 2 100 98 100 1.02
0 2 100 95 100 1.05
1 1 100 100 100 1
1 1 100 99 100 1.01
1 1 100 98 100 1.02
1 1 100 95 100 1.05
1 2 100 100 100 1
1 2 100 99 100 1.01
1 2 100 98 100 1.02
1 2 100 95 100 1.05
Note: This table shows variations in starting times t, delay length k, and interest rates (1+r)
to identify the key parameters from survey responses (see text). These include the normative
time preference δ, the behavioral time preference β, and the utility function curvature. The
survey was conducted in June 2019 to participants and opted-out workers ever had access
to OregonSaves. Survey questions are provided in Appendix C. Parameters of interest are
identified using regression models specified in Equations (13) and (14). Estimation results
are presented in Table 9.
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Table 9: Parameter Estimates of Time Preferences and Utility Function Curvature
(1) (2)
Estimates from Eq.(13) Estimates from Eq.(14)
Normative time preference δ 0.995 0.987
(0.006) (0.005)
Behavioral time preference λ 0.987 0.993
(0.005) (0.007)
CRRA curvature: α 0.501
(0.089)
CARA curvature: ρ 2.033
(0.374)
Observations 1,765 1,765
N. unique subjects 143 143
Note: Data from anonymized survey responses collected in June 2019. An online experi-
mental survey was sent to 441 OregonSaves-eligible workers, including those who opted out
and participating as of June 2019. There are 143 survey respondents who answered the time
preference survey questions provided in Appendix C, and these respondents made 1,765 in-
tertemporal decisions in total. Both columns present estimation results from two-limit Tobit
maximum likelihood regressions. Column 1 shows estimates of the regression specification
in the form of Equation (13) assuming constant relative risk aversion utility (CRRA). The
annual background consumption w = −1, 040 was set to equal to the negative of the min-
imum consumption level among all survey respondents. The average normative discount
factor δ under CRRA is 0.995, and the average behavioral discount factor β under CRRA
is 0.987. Column 2 shows estimates of the regression specification in the form of Equation
(14) assuming constant absolute risk aversion utility (CARA). The average δ under CARA
is 0.987 and the average β under CARA is 0.993. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 10: Social Marginal Welfare Weight g Calculations
l-type savers h-type savers
Average annual income Zs $24,487 $36,257
Percent of type hs 71.8% 6%
Primitive Pareto weight αs =
1
Zs
0.000041 0.000028
Aggregate weighted Pareto weight α¯ =
∑
s={l,h} αshs 0.000031 0.000031
Social marginal welfare weight gs =
αs
α¯
1.32 0.90
Notes: This table reports estimates of the social marginal welfare weights for l-type passive
savers (preferred rates below the default) and for h-type passive savers (preferred rates above
the default). The welfare weight for a given type gs is the Pareto weight αs normalized
by the aggregate weighted Pareto weight α¯. The normalization ensures that the welfare
weights gs only depend on the relative difference in income across types but are independent
of the absolute size of income within type. These calculations are based on two empirical
assumptions. First, we use observed data when the default rate is 5% to estimate the welfare
weights at the optimal default. Second, statistics on annual income and the percent of type
for l-type passive savers are inferred from the average level of all savers who elected a rate
below the default; statistics for h-type passive savers are inferred by the average level of all
savers who elected a rate above the default. The income information for each type Zs is
imputed from the OregonSaves savings data in June 2019, where individual-level monthly
income equals the contribution amount divided by the contribution rate. Only individuals
with a positive contribution amount and a positive rate are taken into account due to the
limitation of the imputation calculation. Imputed average annual income equals the average
monthly income times 12. Following Saez (2002), the third row shows that the primitive
Pareto weight αs equals the inverse of income
1
Zs
. The fourth row shows that the aggregate
weighted Pareto weight is the primitive Pareto weight αs weighted by the percent of each
type hs.
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Table 11: Baseline Optimal Default Contribution Rate Calculations
Statistics Values
Panel A: Statistics for l-type passive savers
Semi-elasticity l -0.12
Normative time preference δl 0.995
Behavioral time preference βl 0.982
Annual income Zl $24,487
Social marginal welfare weight gl 1.32
Preferred rate of passive savers on the margin sl 0.04
Panel B: Statistics for h-type passive savers
Semi-elasticity h 0.17
Normative time preference δh 0.995
Behavioral time preference βh 0.987
Annual income Zh $36,257
Social marginal welfare weight gh 0.90
Preferred rate of passive savers on the margin sh 0.09
Panel C: Opt-out costs
Money-metric cost of opting out of the default rate K $250
Fraction of normative opt-out cost pi 0
Panel D: Optimal default rate
Baseline optimal default rate r∗ 8.3%
Notes: Estimates of key statistics used to compute the optimal default contribution rate in
Proposition 1: All statistics in Panel A and Panel B are estimated from the OregonSaves
data (see text) except that h uses data from Beshears et al. (2012). Estimates for δl, β1,
δh, and βh are identified using survey data collected from OregonSaves-eligible workers in
Table 9 (see Section 4.2). Estimation procedures for gl and gh are are provided in Table 10.
In Panel C, the value of K borrows from Choukhmane (2018). Calculation details for the
baseline optimal default rate in Panel D are provided in Section 5.
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Figure 1: Impact of a Marginal Perturbation of the Optimal Default Contribution Rate r∗
r*
𝑚𝑙
0 Preferred rate s𝑠𝑙 𝑠ℎ
Density 𝑚𝑠
𝑚ℎ
𝑚𝑟∗ = 𝑚𝑙 +𝑚ℎ
(a) Before a marginal perturbation of r∗
r*0 Preferred rate s𝑠𝑙 𝑠ℎ
Density 𝑚𝑠
𝑚𝑟∗
d𝑚𝑙
(-)
d𝑚ℎ
(+)
d𝑚𝑟 = d𝑚𝑙 + d𝑚ℎ
(-)
r’
r’=r*+dr
𝑠𝑙
′ 𝑠ℎ
′
(b) After a marginal perturbation from r∗ to r′ = r∗ + dr
Note: See Section 3.2 for details. Solid curves and lines in Figure (a) are the observed density
distribution of workers based on their actual contribution rates when the default rate is r∗.
Workers with an underlying preferred rate between sl and sh are passive savers by accepting
the default rate, where the fraction of l-type passive savers is ml, and the fraction of h-type
passive savers is mh. The observed density at the optimal default is mr∗ = ml +mh. Figure
(b) shows that, after a marginal increase in the default rate to r′, the observed density at
the new default rate decreases by dmr. There are dml fraction of l-type passive savers who
stop saving at the default because r′ is farther from their preferred rate, and dmh fraction
of h-type active savers start to save at the default because it is closer to their preferred rate.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
The first-order condition for the social welfare function, Equation (3), equals zero at the
optimal default rate r∗:
dW (r∗)
dr
=
d
dr
∫ sh
s=sl
αsN(Ps)dms
≈
∫ sh
s=sl
αs
dN(Rs)
dr
dms +
dmh
dr
αh(N(Rh)−N(Sh))− dml
dr
αl(N(Sl)−N(Rl)) (15)
= 0.
The first term in Equation (15) can be decomposed into two terms:
∫ sh
s=sl
αs
dNs
dr
dms
≈
∫ r∗
sl
αl
dN(Rl)
dr
dml +
∫ sh
r∗
αh
dN(Rh)
dr
dmh
= αl
dN(Rl)
dr
ml + αh
dN(Rh)
dr
mh
= αl
dN
dRl
dRl
dr
ml + αh
dN
dRh
dRh
dr
mh
= αl
dN
dRl
Zlml + αh
dN
dRh
Zhmh, (16)
where Rl = r · Zl so that dRldr = Zl. Based on Equation (2) that N = U + (1 − βl)δlv(Rl),
the partial derivative dN
dRl
can be rewritten as:
dN
dRl
=
d
dRl
(U + (1− βl)δlv(Rl))
=(1− βl)δlv′Rl
=(1− βl)δl glλ
αl
, (17)
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where gl :=
αlv
′
Rl
λ
by definition. Similarly, dN
dRh
= (1 − βh)δh ghλαh . Combining Equations (16)
and (17), we rewrite the first term in Equation (15) as:
∫ sh
sl
αs
dN(Ds)
dr
dms
=αl
∂N
∂Rl
Zlml + αh
∂N
∂Rh
Zhmh
=(1− βl)δlglλZlml + (1− βh)δhghλZhmh. (18)
Based on Equation (2) that N(Ps) = U(Ps) + (1 − βs)δsv(Ps) + (1 − pi)K1{Ps 6= Rs},
where s ∈ {h, l} and Ps ∈ {Rs, Ss}, the second term in Equation (15) can be rewritten as:
dmh
dr
αh(N(Rh)−N(Sh))
=
dmh
dr
αh
(
U(Rh) + (1− βh)δhv(Rh)− U(Sh)− (1− βh)δhv(Sh)− (1− pi)K
)
=
dmh
dr
αh
(
(1− βh)δh(v(Rh)− v(Sh))− (1− pi)K
)
. (19)
Workers on the margin of switching to their preferred saving amount Sh(= shZh) are indiffer-
ent from saving at the default or their preference in terms of the decision utility. Therefore,
U(Rh) = U(Sh). Based on Assumption (4) that v(Rh) = Rh and the definition of gh in
Section 3.1 that αh =
ghλ
v′Rh
= ghλ, Equation (19) can be expressed as:
dmh
dr
αh(N(Rh)−N(Sh))
=
dmh
dr
αh
(
(1− βh)δh(Rh − Sh)− (1− pi)K
)
=
dmh
dr
ghλ
(
(1− βh)δh(r∗ − sh)Zh − (1− pi)K
)
. (20)
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Similarly, the third term in Equation (15) can be expressed as:
dml
dr
αl(N(Sl)−N(Rl))
=
dml
dr
αl
(
U(Sl) + (1− βl)δlSl + (1− pil)Kl − U(Rl)− (1− βl)δlRl
)
=
dml
dr
glλ
(
(1− βl)δl(sl − r∗)Zl + (1− pi)K
)
. (21)
Combining Equations (18), (20), and (21), we get
dW (r∗)
dr
=(1− βl)δlglλZlml + (1− βh)δhghλZhmh
+
dmh
dr
ghλ
(
(1− βh)δh(r∗ − sh)Zh − (1− pi)K
)
− dml
dr
glλ
(
(1− βl)δl(sl − r∗)Zl + (1− pi)K
)
(22)
=0.
We rearrange Equation (22) and plug in semi-elasticities l =
dml
dr
1
md
< 0 and h =
dmh
dr
1
md
> 0:
dW (r∗)
dr
= (1− βl)δlglZlml − dml
dr
gl(1− βl)δl(sl − r∗)Zl − dml
dr
gl(1− pi)K
+ (1− βh)δhghZhmh + dmh
dr
gh(1− βh)δh(r∗ − sh)Zh − dmh
dr
gh(1− pi)K
= (1− βl)δlglZlml
md
+ |l|gl(1− βl)δl(sl − r∗)Zl + |l|gl(1− pi)K
+ (1− βh)δhghZhmh
md
+ |h|gh(1− βh)δh(r∗ − sh)Zh − |h|gh(1− pi)K
= 0.
The overall welfare effect can be decomposed into several terms after the optimal initial
default rate marginally increases from r∗ to r∗ + dr:
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1. The aggregate weighted welfare gain to all passive savers on the intensive margin is
dI = (1− βl)δlglZl mlmd + (1− βh)δhghZh
mh
md
.
2. The welfare gain to l-type workers for switching to their preferred rate sl under the
new default r∗ + dr is dSl = |l|gl(1− βl)δlslZl.
3. The welfare loss to l-type workers for opting out of the default rate is dRl = |l|gl(1−
βl)δlZl.
4. The welfare loss to h-type workers for no longer saving at their preferred rate sh is
dSh = |h|gh(1− βh)δhshZh.
5. The welfare gain to h-type workers for starting to save at the default rate is dRh =
|h|gh(1− βh)δhZh.
6. The welfare gain to l-type workers for making an active choice is dKl = |l|gl(1−pi)K.
7. The welfare loss to h-type workers for no longer making an active choice is dKh =
|h|gh(1− pi)K.
Rearranging the last equation, we solve for the optimal default rate r∗:
r∗ =
dI + dSl − dSh + dKl − dKh
dRl − dRh .
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B Distributions of Contribution Rates from Beshears et al. (2012)
to Identify Semi-Elasticities in Section 4.1.2
Description from Beshears et al. (2012): Figure 3. The Distribution of Employee Contri-
bution Rates at Firm C with a 3% Default. This figure gives the distribution of employee
contribution rates at one year of tenure at Firm C when there was a 3% default contribu-
tion rate. The sample is the 2,785 full-time employees who were hired at the firm between
January 1, 2003 and February 29, 2004, who remained at the firm for at least one year, and
who were not Highly Compensated Employees. The default contribution rate was 3%, and
the minimum contribution rate necessary to obtain the full employer match was 7%.
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Figure 4. The Distribution of Employee Contribution Rates at Firm C with a 5% Default.
This figure gives the distribution of employee contribution rates at one year of tenure at
Firm C when there was a 5% default contribution rate. The sample is the 3,765 full-time
employees who were hired at the firm between June 1, 2005 and July 31, 2006, who remained
at the firm for at least one year, and who were not Highly Compensated Employees. The
default contribution rate was 5%, and the minimum contribution rate necessary to obtain
the full employer match was 7%.
C Survey Questions to Elicit Time Preferences
Survey design and results are explained in Section 4.2, Table 8, and Table 9.
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OregonSaves Follow-Up Survey
Survey navigat ion:
Next wil l  advance you to the following question. After the last question, be sure to select Submi t to complete the survey.
OregonSaves is overseen by the Oregon Retirement Savings Board. Ascensus College Savings Recordkeeping Services, LLC (“ACRS”) is the program administrator. ACRS and its
affi l iates are responsible for day-to-day program operations. Participants saving through OregonSaves beneficial ly own and have control  over their  Roth IRAs, as provided in the
program offering set out at saver.oregonsaves.com.
OregonSaves’ Portfolios offer investment options selected by the Oregon Retirement Savings Board. For more information on OregonSaves’ Portfolios go to
saver.oregonsaves.com. Account balances in OregonSaves wil l  vary with market conditions and are not guaranteed or insured by the Oregon Retirement Savings Board,  the State of
Oregon, the Federal  Deposit  Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or any other organization.
OregonSaves is a completely voluntary retirement program. Saving through a Roth IRA wil l  not be appropriate for al l  individuals.  Employer faci l i tat ion of OregonSaves should not
be considered an endorsement or recommendation by your employer of OregonSaves, Roth IRAs, or these investments. Roth IRAs are not exclusive to OregonSaves and can be
obtained outside of the program and contributed to outside of payrol l  deduction. Contributing to an OregonSaves Roth IRA through payrol l  deduction offers some tax benefits and
consequences. You should consult  your tax or f inancial  advisor if  you have questions related to taxes or investments.
The OregonSaves mark and OregonSaves logo are trademarks of the Oregon Retirement Savings Board and may not be used without permission.
Completed:
Instructions:  The following questions are all hypothetical, and your answers will not affect the amount of the gift card
you will receive by completing the survey. In each of the following questions, please tell us how you think about
tradeoffs between today and the future, by moving the slider. We ask you in each case to click the slider dividing 100
tokens between two dates. Here is an example:
This example shows how someone could divide 100 tokens between 70 today and 30 for a year from today. Each
token today is worth $95, while each token for a year from today is worth $100. So this person would choose to
receive 70*$95=$6,650 today and 30*$100=$3,000 a year from today.
Please use the slider to select the number of tokens you would like to receive today.
1. Each token is worth $100 today and $100 in a year. How many tokens would you want to receive today?
1. Amount you will have today
1. Amount you will have in a year
2. Each token is worth $99 today and $100 in a year. How many tokens would you want to receive today?
2. Amount you will have today
2. Amount you will have in a year
3. Each token is worth $98 today and $100 in a year. How many tokens would you want to receive today?
3. Amount you will have today
3. Amount you will have in a year
4. Each token is worth $95 today and $100 in a year. How many tokens would you want to receive today?
4. Amount you will have today
4. Amount you will have in a year
00 100
00 100
00 100
00 100
  
OregonSaves Follow-Up Survey
Survey navigat ion:
Next wil l  advance you to the following question. After the last question, be sure to select Submi t to complete the survey.
OregonSaves is overseen by the Oregon Retirement Savings Board. Ascensus College Savings Recordkeeping Services, LLC (“ACRS”) is the program
administrator.  ACRS and its aff i l iates are responsible for day-to-day program operations. Participants saving through OregonSaves beneficial ly own
and have control over their  Roth IRAs, as provided in the program offering set out at saver.oregonsaves.com.
OregonSaves’ Portfolios offer investment options selected by the Oregon Retirement Savings Board. For more information on OregonSaves’
Portfol ios go to saver.oregonsaves.com. Account balances in OregonSaves wil l  vary with market condit ions and are not guaranteed or insured by
the Oregon Retirement Savings Board,  the State of Oregon, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or any other organization.
OregonSaves is a completely voluntary retirement program. Saving through a Roth IRA wil l  not be appropriate for al l  individuals.  Employer
facil itation of OregonSaves should not be considered an endorsement or recommendation by your employer of OregonSaves, Roth IRAs, or these
investments. Roth IRAs are not exclusive to OregonSaves and can be obtained outside of the program and contributed to outside of payroll
deduction. Contributing to an OregonSaves Roth IRA through payroll  deduction offers some tax benefits and consequences. You should consult  your
tax or f inancial  advisor if  you have questions related to taxes or investments.
The OregonSaves mark and OregonSaves logo are trademarks of the Oregon Retirement Savings Board and may not be used without permission.
Completed:
Please use the slider to select the number of tokens you would like to receive today.
1. Each token is worth $100 today and $100 in two years. How many tokens would you want to receive today?
1. Amount you will have today
1. Amount you will have in two years
2. Each token is worth $99 today and $100 in two years. How many tokens would you want to receive today?
2. Amount you will have today
2. Amount you will have in two years
3. Each token is worth $98 today and $100 in two years. How many tokens would you want to receive today?
3. Amount you will have today
3. Amount you will have in two years
4. Each token is worth $95 today and $100 in two years. How many tokens would you want to receive today?
4. Amount you will have today
4. Amount you will have in two years
00 100
00 100
00 100
00 100
  
OregonSaves Follow-Up Survey
Survey navigat ion:
Next wil l  advance you to the following question. After the last question, be sure to select Submi t to complete the survey.
OregonSaves is overseen by the Oregon Retirement Savings Board. Ascensus College Savings Recordkeeping Services, LLC (“ACRS”) is the program
administrator.  ACRS and its aff i l iates are responsible for day-to-day program operations. Participants saving through OregonSaves beneficial ly own
and have control over their  Roth IRAs, as provided in the program offering set out at saver.oregonsaves.com.
OregonSaves’ Portfolios offer investment options selected by the Oregon Retirement Savings Board. For more information on OregonSaves’
Portfol ios go to saver.oregonsaves.com. Account balances in OregonSaves wil l  vary with market condit ions and are not guaranteed or insured by
the Oregon Retirement Savings Board,  the State of Oregon, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or any other organization.
OregonSaves is a completely voluntary retirement program. Saving through a Roth IRA wil l  not be appropriate for al l  individuals.  Employer
facil itation of OregonSaves should not be considered an endorsement or recommendation by your employer of OregonSaves, Roth IRAs, or these
investments. Roth IRAs are not exclusive to OregonSaves and can be obtained outside of the program and contributed to outside of payroll
deduction. Contributing to an OregonSaves Roth IRA through payroll  deduction offers some tax benefits and consequences. You should consult  your
tax or f inancial  advisor if  you have questions related to taxes or investments.
The OregonSaves mark and OregonSaves logo are trademarks of the Oregon Retirement Savings Board and may not be used without permission.
Completed:
Please use the slider to select the number of tokens you would like to receive in a year.
1. Each token is worth $99 today and $100 in a year. How many tokens would you want to receive today?
1. Amount you will have in a year
1. Amount you will have in two years
2. Each token is worth $98 today and $100 in a year. How many tokens would you want to receive today?
2. Amount you will have in a year
2. Amount you will have in two years
3. Each token is worth $97 today and $100 in a year. How many tokens would you want to receive today?
3. Amount you will have in a year
3. Amount you will have in two years
4. Each token is worth $95 today and $100 in a year. How many tokens would you want to receive today?
4. Amount you will have in a year
4. Amount you will have in two years
00 100
00 100
00 100
00 100
  
OregonSaves Follow-Up Survey
Survey navigat ion:
Next wil l  advance you to the following question. After the last question, be sure to select Submi t to complete the survey.
OregonSaves is overseen by the Oregon Retirement Savings Board. Ascensus College Savings Recordkeeping Services, LLC (“ACRS”) is the program
administrator.  ACRS and its aff i l iates are responsible for day-to-day program operations. Participants saving through OregonSaves beneficial ly own
and have control over their  Roth IRAs, as provided in the program offering set out at saver.oregonsaves.com.
OregonSaves’ Portfolios offer investment options selected by the Oregon Retirement Savings Board. For more information on OregonSaves’
Portfol ios go to saver.oregonsaves.com. Account balances in OregonSaves wil l  vary with market condit ions and are not guaranteed or insured by
the Oregon Retirement Savings Board,  the State of Oregon, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or any other organization.
OregonSaves is a completely voluntary retirement program. Saving through a Roth IRA wil l  not be appropriate for al l  individuals.  Employer
facil itation of OregonSaves should not be considered an endorsement or recommendation by your employer of OregonSaves, Roth IRAs, or these
investments. Roth IRAs are not exclusive to OregonSaves and can be obtained outside of the program and contributed to outside of payroll
deduction. Contributing to an OregonSaves Roth IRA through payroll  deduction offers some tax benefits and consequences. You should consult  your
tax or f inancial  advisor if  you have questions related to taxes or investments.
The OregonSaves mark and OregonSaves logo are trademarks of the Oregon Retirement Savings Board and may not be used without permission.
Completed:
Please use the slider to select the number of tokens you would like to receive in a year.
1. Each token is worth $100 in a year and $100 in three years. How many tokens would you want to receive today?
1. Amount you will have in a year
1. Amount you will have in three years
2. Each token is worth $99 in a year and $100 in three years. How many tokens would you want to receive today?
2. Amount you will have in a year
2. Amount you will have in three years
3. Each token is worth $98 in a year and $100 in three years. How many tokens would you want to receive today?
3. Amount you will have in a year
3. Amount you will have in three years
4. Each token is worth $95 in a year and $100 in three years. How many tokens would you want to receive today?
4. Amount you will have in a year
4. Amount you will have in three years
00 100
00 100
00 100
00 100
